The relationship between the Supreme Court and lower courts is more complicated than it may appear at first glance. In order to better understand this relationship, we examine how Supreme Court precedent affects state supreme court decision-making. Toward this end, we investigate whether and how Supreme Court precedent impacts lower court decisions. Examining state supreme court decisions in the area of search and seizure, we specifically test hypotheses about how state judicial context and Supreme Court behavior influences when the lower court is likely to be affected by Supreme Court precedent. We address the nature of state supreme court responses to Supreme Court precedent in search and seizure cases decided between 1983 and 1993. We find that there is substantial variation in the responses to precedent by state supreme courts. Specifically, we find that precedent does have a substantial influence on the behavior of state supreme court justices, but judicial ideology and the level of historical conflict between the Supreme Court and the state supreme court are also important in understanding the dissemination of precedent to the states. Most interestingly, the effect of judicial retention methods on the application of precedent are considerable.
Introduction
There exists a diverse body of research on how lower courts are impacted by Supreme Court precedent (Beiser 1968; Benesh and Reddick 2002; Gruhl 1980; Johnson 1979; Klein and Hume 2003; Emmert and Traut 1994; Hoekstra 2005; Romans 1974 ).
To the extent that state supreme courts have been the subject of such work, the findings suggest that they are attentive to precedent but vary notably in their application of the Court's decisions. At times, Supreme Court precedent appears to have a tangible influence on the outcomes of the decisions of state supreme court justices, while in other contexts the ideology of the justices or state level political factors serve to mitigate the power of precedent.
The relationship between the Supreme Court and lower courts is therefore more complicated than it may appear at first glance. In order to better understand this relationship, we examine the impact of Supreme Court precedent on state supreme court decision-making. Examining state supreme court decisions in the area of search and seizure, we assess how state judicial context and Supreme Court precedent influences how state courts respond to the precedent they cite. Our findings suggest that the judicial retention system and the degree of Supreme Court monitoring of the state supreme court are of primary importance in understanding the responses of state supreme court justices to Supreme Court precedent. Specifically, justices in merit retention states are more attentive to precedent of the Supreme Court than justices in either elite or competitive election systems.
The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on Lower Courts
Judicial decision-makers are influenced by a complex array of factors, including their own preferences (Brace, Langer, and Hall 2000; Segal and Spaeth 2002) and the political environment (Epstein and Knight 2000; Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000) . But the decisions of other courts, especially higher courts, are also important. Partly this is because precedent is a guide for how to make decisions in the presence of specific fact patterns (Emmert 1992; Emmert and Traut 1994; George and Epstein 1992; Segal 1984 Segal , 1986 Segal and Spaeth 2002) . It is also because precedent is a normative guide for lower courts, especially in cases with novel fact pact patterns (Knight and Epstein 1996; Landes and Posner 1976; Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Wahlbeck 1997) .
Nevertheless, there is considerable debate about the ability of higher courts to get lower courts to adhere to their decisions. Much of the work on the role of precedent focuses on the hierarchical nature of the federal court system, analyzing how the lower court's political preferences interact with the Supreme Court's limited ability to monitor them to produce variations in lower court behavior (Benesh and Reddick 2001; Dickson 1994; Gruhl 1980 Gruhl , 1981 Johnson 1979; Romans 1974; Tarr 1977; Wasby 1970) . Recent research on the federal circuit courts indicates that the Supreme Court's limited ability to hear cases affects both which courts they tend to review (Cameron, Segal, and Songer 2000) and the extent to which lower court justices "shirk" in order to pursue their own policy interests (Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994 ; but see also Cross 2005 (Brace and Hall 1990 , 1993 Hall and Brace 1989 . Clearly state supreme court justices work in an environment with a wide array of legal and institutional pressures (see Langer 2002) . We expect that these forces -both legal and electoral -will affect the choices made by state supreme court justices in search and seizure cases. Our goal here is to expand on these themes by systematically exploring how these state conditions predicate the influence of Supreme Court precedent.
Theoretical Framework
The use of Supreme Court precedent by state supreme courts is complicated by the difficulty state judges have in reconciling state and federal law. Previous studies of Supreme Court/Circuit Court of Appeals interactions relies in large part on principalagent theory to explain the dissemination of Supreme Court precedent among those courts (Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994; Cameron, Segal, and Songer 2000; Westerland, Segal, Epstein, Comparato, and Cameron 2006 Because state supreme court justices are motivated to retain their position, they behave in a manner to minimize the risk of removal. As a result, they must concern themselves not only with the probability that their decisions may be reviewed and overturned by the Supreme Court, but must also be mindful of the local political context. Baum 1983 Baum , 1987 Dubois 1979; Sheldon and Lovrich 1983) . More importantly, the low level of monitoring implies that they should be relatively safe and secure as long as they do not engage in behavior that alerts the public. 2 We conjecture that a prominent way for this to occur is by engaging in protracted contract with the Supreme Court because that is likely to draw the attention of the media and opinion leaders.
Finally, the presence of potential competitors in some electoral systems ought to also produce some variations in judicial behavior. Even as we expect judges in those systems to be risk averse and generally wanting to avoid conflict with the Supreme Court, the possibility of facing competition -even if rare -means that they must be in a position to defend their decisions to an electorate concerned with more than just judicial merit.
Since the Supreme Court traditionally has more power to set a floor, rather than a ceiling, in civil liberties cases, that provides these justices with political cover when citing liberal precedent. Consequently, we expect conflict with the Supreme Court to produce responsiveness to liberal precedent, but not to conservative precedent. In merit systems, the absence of competitors to point out the policy impact of judicial decisions implies an opposite effect -all that matters is to avoid calling attention to oneself. As such, conflict with the Supreme Court ought to produce responsiveness to both liberal and conservative precedent.
Although the state supreme court justices' motivations, and the Supreme Court's limited control over state courts, should limit the impact of Supreme Court precedent on state decisions, we argue that monitoring by the Supreme Court still matters. What differs from the Court's monitoring of federal courts is that its impact depends upon the political position of the state court. When ignoring the Supreme Court benefits the lower court's ability to signal their quality to the appropriate decision makers at the state level, we wholly expect them to ignore precedent. However, there may be situations where conflict with the Court draws unwanted attention and increases the risk of retention for state justices, thus creating a situation where they may be more willing to follow precedent. The question, of course, is when monitoring by the Supreme Court interacts with local monitoring to create a situation in which they follow precedent.
Data and Variables
Sample. In order to test these hypotheses, we analyze a sample of state supreme court cases that cite orally argued search and seizure cases decided by the Supreme Court between the 1983 and 1993 terms. We choose to analyze search and seizure cases because 1.) the likelihood of progeny existing in every state is high, and 2.) it has remained a relatively constant part of the Supreme Court's docket. Additionally, using search and seizure cases allows us to test for judicial impact in a traditional area of state responsibility (Baum 1978) .
We first identified all orally argued search and seizure cases decided by the Supreme Court between the 1983 and 1993 terms -a total of 63 cases. 3 For each of these Supreme
Court cases, we used Shepard's Citations to compile a list of every decision in a state court of last resort in which it was cited for the years 1983-1995. This creates a population of progeny from which we randomly selected 974 cases -approximately thirty-one percent of all state supreme court cases citing these Supreme Court decisions -on which to gather further data. These progeny serve as our primary unit of analysis. 4 Using this approach provides a large number of relevant state supreme court cases and identifies those cases of most interest to our research questions -those that cite Supreme Court precedent.
Although expedient, this methodology has recognizable limits. First, this sampling approach potentially overstates the impact of Supreme Court precedent by not including cases which fail to cite precedent. The primary means of addressing this is by limiting our conclusions to the appropriate progeny, keeping in mind that a broader statement of the Court's impact on the states requires us to model the selection process. Second, state supreme courts cite Supreme Court precedent that they do not directly deal with in their own decision. For example, if a lower court disagrees with a specific decision of the Supreme Court, they may bury the reference to that offending precedent amongst a number of other cases cited in an attempt to evade the holding of that case. In other words, they may not be addressing cited precedent in any depth.
To address this second issue, we coded for the total number of citations in the progeny and the length of the citation string where the generating Supreme Court case was found. 5 Over 70% of the progeny contain only one citation to a Supreme Court decision, and only two cases are cited in nearly 90% of the progeny. Our data also suggest that state courts do not "bury" references in a string of cases. In approximately 65% of the progeny, the Supreme Court precedent is cited alone, and it is joined by a second case in only 21% of the progeny. We take this as evidence that the Supreme Court precedents we use to generate our sample are central to the case under consideration by the progeny. We believe this to be fairly compelling evidence that state supreme court justices recognize the relevance of the Supreme Court precedent, rely on it in their opinions, and appear to make little effort to obfuscate the fact that it is pertinent to the case at hand. This makes us feel more confident that our data gathering approach yields a set of cases and measures that are germane to the issue of state supreme court compliance.
Variables. Following other work in the field, our dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of whether the state court ruled in favor of the government (coded "1") or the individual (coded "0"). Our hypotheses point to three different types of independent variables that should affect this variable -measures of case facts, judicial political preferences, and institutional constraints. To evaluate the normative effects of Supreme Court precedent, we include a variable that captures the degree to which the factual circumstances of the state supreme court decisions mirror conditions determined as important in Supreme Court precedent writ large. Following Segal (1984) , we first measure the presence of seven different facts in search and seizure cases. 6 For each of these, the Supreme Court has previously established the validity of police searches in its presence. Our variable is a count of how many of these are present in the progeny case.
The logic of this measure is straightforward -when a case before a state supreme court strongly overlaps with existing Supreme Court precedent, the likelihood that the state court upholds a search is higher. Including this measure allows us to better evaluate the political impact of cited precedent by controlling for both its normative effects and its usefulness to state court decision-makers.
We measure the political preferences of judicial actors in a manner similar to previous studies in the field. First, we do not explicitly measure the predilections of the Supreme Court. Between 1983 and 1993, the mean ideology score on the Supreme Court is always conservative, though it does shift slightly to the right in 1986 with Rehnquist replacing Burger as chief justice, and the appointment of Scalia to the Court. Because it is a relative constant throughout the course of our sample, it is not explicitly incorporated into our analyses. 7 We do include a measure of the precedent's direction in order to gauge its policy impact (see Hoekstra 2005 ). This measure is coded one if the Supreme
Court ruled in favor of the government and zero otherwise. Assuming that state courts mainly cite relevant precedent, then this variable should increase the likelihood of a similar decision at the state level, ceteris paribus, if it has an impact on the lower court (Hoekstra 2005) . We measure the ideology of state supreme court justices using PAJID scores (Brace, Langer, and Hall 2000) . Specifically, the variable is the median PAJID score for state supreme courts by year over the 1983 -1995 period. 8 This is an interval measure with a range from zero (highly conservative) to one hundred (highly liberal). Descriptive statistics for the independent variables are reported in Table 1 . With these data we are able to evaluate our hypotheses about lower court decision-making in ways that have not yet been attempted. Unlike other studies, that focus on a relatively small number of cases in a single issue area for a few courts (see Beavers and Walz 1998; Beiser 1968; Cross and Tiller 1998; Dickson 1994; Gruhl 1981; Romans 1974; Smith and Tiller 2002), we are able to evaluate how all state supreme courts address decisions of the Supreme Court. In the following section, we discuss the results from these models.
[ Table 1 about here]
Levels of Impact
Does the Supreme Court affect the direction of state supreme court decisions through precedent? As a first cut at this question, we look at the simplest -but most straightforward -piece of evidence. [ [ Table 3 about here]
These data hold important insights into the working of our judicial system. 
Predicting the Outcomes of Progeny
The next step in our analysis is to model the outcomes of individual progeny as a function of case characteristics, judicial political preferences, and institutional constraints. Since our dependent variable is dichotomous (1 = decision in favor of state, 0 = decision in favor of individual), we use a logit model to estimate the impact of each independent variable on the probability that the state supreme court rules in favor of the government. To account for possible dependencies among cases decided in the same state, we employ clustered standard errors by state. Given that our theoretical framework predicts that state judicial institutions determine its responsiveness to policy influence of Supreme Court precedent, we separate our data into different samples by judicial retention method -Elite Retention, Competitive Election, and Retention (Merit) Election.
The results are reported in Table 4 .
[ Table 4 Election models, the coefficient is statistically insignificant.
More central to the questions identified in this paper are the coefficients associated with the direction of cited Supreme Court precedent, the level of conflict between the Supreme Court and state court, and the interaction of these two variables.
Because of the interaction term, the standard errors reported in the table do not provide us with complete information on the significance of these three variables (Friedrich 1982) .
Nevertheless, there are some interesting differences between the results in different institutional settings. Most importantly, in elite selection systems, the baseline impact of Supreme Court precedent is higher than it is in either of the electoral systems. What this means is that, in the absence of any reversals there is a greater tendency toward impact in the elite systems than in electoral systems. 10 Conversely, in electoral systems the impact of precedent is more clearly dependant upon the actions of the Supreme Court, a fact reflected in the somewhat larger coefficients associated with frequency of reversal and the interaction term.
While we reserve our full discussion of these results for the next section, the statistical results provide the foundation for some interesting conclusions. Foremost among them is that, no matter the institutional or political circumstances faced by state justices, they respond to the broad normative constraints established by Supreme Court precedent. This is consistent with arguments that 1) the Supreme Court sets a floor for the states on civil liberties issues, and; 2) legal norms are important for establishing coherency throughout the judiciary. Beyond this, we find that political factors still matter a great deal, though the manner and extent to which they matter depends upon the local institutions for selecting and retaining justices. In particular, it appears that judges in states with electoral systems are more responsive to the specific political predilections ensconced in precedent when they have been susceptible to the higher courts intervention in recent years.
Substantive Effects
To get a better understanding of how Supreme Court precedent impacts state decisions in different settings, we show the impact of our variables on the probability that the state court favors the government in its decision. Using the coefficient values from Table 4 and holding all other variables at their means (not including interaction coefficients), we first focus on the effects of frequency of reversal. 11 In doing so, we compute probabilities for courts that are relatively liberal, moderate, and conservative.
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Finally, we engage in this exercise for Supreme Court precedent that is both proindividual (labeled as "Liberal" in the graph) and pro-government (labeled as "Conservative") Supreme Court precedent. Figure 1 shows the impact of frequency of reversal in elite systems. Two things stand out in this graph. Foremost is that the impact of frequency of reversal is to always reduce the probability that a state wins. Although this is not inconsistent with our theoretical expectations, we can offer no clear explanation within our framework either. It would seem that these courts see all conflict with the Supreme Court as encouraging them to pay attention to the floor, but we cannot convincingly demonstrate the veracity of this claim.
Additionally, we see that judicial ideology has next-to-no impact on state judicial decisions in these systems. Indeed, the lines for conservative, moderate, and liberal courts are indistinguishable.
[ Figure 1 about here] This confirms the importance of state judicial institutions for creating situations in which judicial actors can consume their own ideological preferences, though the effect is not very strong.
[ Figure 2 about here]
What we see in these graphs is a striking difference based upon the direction of the cited Supreme Court precedent. When it is conservative -that is, it establishes a ceiling -state courts typically have at least a 70% probability of also making a conservative decision. A similar picture emerges when state courts cite liberal Supreme Court decisions -those that establish a floor. Keeping in mind that these state courts are susceptible to close monitoring by state political actors, the states are less likely to win if they have been reversed recently. Regardless of the ideology of the state supreme court court's ideology, the probability of a pro-government decision is around 70% If we assume that governors and legislatures do not want high profile criminal cases to be overturned, this seems like a reasonable result. However, as the Supreme Court becomes more involved through overturning the states, it can effectively enforce its floor. For states that have been overturned five or more times, the probability of a pro-government decision drops below the 50% line for both liberal and conservative precedent.
Also of interest here is that, despite the fact that state court political preferences are substantively important, the Supreme Court is still capable of encouraging lower courts to comply with its pro-individual decisions. There is more resistance in these systems to conservative precedent, witnessed by the fact that state courts regardless of ideology do not alter their behavior in the face of numerous reversals. This is entirely in keeping with the idea that the federal constitution sets a floor for individual rights and that states are free to afford greater protections. When justices in competitive election states cite liberal Supreme Court precedent the probability of the state winning is over 80%, but as they are increasingly reversed by the Supreme Court, the states probability of winning drops quickly.
In Figure 3 , we present the results of the impact of frequency of reversal on state judicial behavior in merit retention systems. Here the substantive results are most striking. In these states, when justices cite liberal decisions of the Supreme Court, the state has a near 80% probability of winning, but by five reversals, that probability has declined below 20%. When citing conservative precedent, regardless of state judicial ideology, the justices are more likely to vote conservatively as the frequency of reversal by the Supreme Court increases. These results are clear examples of the effect of judicial ideology exerting a substantive impact on the outcome -we see justices instrumentally responding to cited precedent on the bases of how frequently they conflict with the Supreme Court. This is consistent with our arguments about risk aversion.
[ Figure 3 about here]
Lastly, in Figure 4 , we present evidence of the substantive importance of case facts on state supreme court behavior. Traditional concepts of precedent suggest that as the case facts in the extant case before a justice more closely resemble those in a previously decided case, the influence of that precedent increases. Here we see clear evidence that the precedent is not treated similarly by justices across retention methods, further confirming our earlier claims that the normative and political impact of precedent depends upon the state judicial institutions.
[ Figure 4 about here]
In elite retention systems, the power of precedent is evident. When citing liberal decisions of the Supreme Court the probability that the state wins rises at approximately the same rate as the number of case facts increases regardless of the rate of reversal, suggesting that justices in those states are responding, not to the 'sanction' being meted by the Supreme Court, but are, in fact, responding to the facts of the case. 13 That changes slightly for justices in competitive election states where recent reversal by the Supreme Court does appear to exert an influence on the probability of the state winning. However, the most striking findings arise when viewing the impact of case facts in merit retention states. Here the effect of Supreme Court reversals on the state is substantial. Where the state court has not been reversed the probability of the state winning is close to 50%, increasing to over 90% by the time they reach six similar case facts. Conversely, where the state has been reversed recently, the probability of the state winning is less than 20%, but that increases to just over 50% of the time when six facts are present. This provides substantial support for the conclusion that in merit retention states, justices are behaving in a risk averse manner to achieve their policy goals within the constraints placed on them by the Supreme Court.
Conclusion
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Progeny Sample Quality.
To assess the quality of our sample, we engaged in some post-hoc examination of the data. First, if our procedure produced an accurate representation of search and seizure progeny, we expected to find that the state supreme court cases would typically involve cases in which one actors was a governmental actor and the other was an individual. This was true in all but eight of the progeny (1.6-percent of the effective sample). In these eight cases, the disputes were between two different individuals and typically involved a property dispute of some type.
If the sampling procedure was successful at producing a random sample, we also expected that the percentage of cases by state would be roughly equal in both the sampling frame and the eventual sample (i.e., not the effective sample). Figure A1 shows that the number of cases per state varies considerably, as would be expected given the substantial differences in state judicial culture and behavior. But we are more interested in whether these numbers correspond in a sensible manner to the proportion of cases by state in the sampling frame.
[ Figure A1 about here]
We examined this by aggregating the number of cases in both the sampling frame and sample to the state level. We then computed a regression in which the percentage of state cases in the sampling frame was used to predict the number of cases in the sample. If the sampling procedure was accurate, we would expect the regression line to have an intercept of zero and a slope of .16, because we randomly drew sixteen percent of the frame for our sample. Figure A2 shows a scatterplot of the number of cases in the sampling frame on the number of cases in the sample, with an actual regression estimate and a line representing a perfectly representative and random sample. According to this graph, our sampling procedure slightly underrepresented states that had the most number of cases in the sampling frame because the actual regression line is shallower than the random sample line. At the same time, the slope estimate (β* = .14) is remarkably similar to the random sample slope (β=.16). And, while there may be some slight heteroskedasticity in the real regression estimate, the actual observations are clustered quite closely around the line. This suggests that the number of cases per state in the sampling frame is quite similar to the number in the sample, suggesting a high degree of representativeness across states.
[ Figure A2 about here] As a final check on the quality of our sample, we wanted to ascertain whether we might have to account for a sample selection bias in the dependent variable. In other words, we decided it was important to determine whether or not there was correlation between the dependent variable and the cases in the sample. Since we only have information on the dependent variable for our sample, we can only determine whether this correlation exists for the sample data. If there was no sample selection problem, we expected that there would be no relationship between the number of cases in a sample and the percentage of cases within each state that complied with Supreme Court precedent (we collapsed the two types of noncompliance). Figure A3 shows a scatterplot of the number of cases in the sample and the percent of noncompliance in each state. As this display clearly demonstrates, there is a negligible relationship between these two variables. This implies that the sample is not biased by having cases from states that exhibit abnormally high or low patterns of noncompliance.
[ Figure A3 about here]
Based on these analyses, we concluded that we did not draw an odd sample and that, in fact, the sample was a reasonable representation of the universe of cases in our sampling frame. This graph shows that the sample cases are not dependent on the extent to which state higher court decisions are consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court.
